For the first time in over half a century, the United States and Russia have entered a period with no legally binding limits on their vast strategic nuclear arsenals. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired on February 5, marking the definitive end of an arms control framework that has shaped global security since the Cold War. The expiration, which followed a prolonged period of diplomatic stalemate and mutual non-compliance, removes the final pillar of a system designed to ensure predictability, verifiable reductions and a measure of stability between the world's two premier nuclear powers.
New START, an Obama-era accord signed in 2010 and last extended in 2021, established verifiable caps on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and the missiles and bombers that carry them. Its core value lay not just in its numerical limits but in its rigorous verification regime, which included mutual on-site inspections and regular data exchanges. This transparency was intended to build confidence and prevent dangerous miscalculations.
The treaty's demise was not sudden but a result of progressive erosion. In February 2023, Russia unilaterally suspended its participation in the treaty's inspection and data-sharing protocols, citing the U.S. support for Ukraine. The United States declared the move legally invalid and responded in kind, effectively freezing the pact's verification mechanisms. While both nations stated they would continue to observe the numerical limits, the trust-building engine of the treaty had already been shut down.
In the months leading to expiration, a diplomatic gap proved unbridgeable. In September 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated Moscow was prepared to informally adhere to the treaty's limits for one year if Washington did the same, framing it as a temporary measure to allow for negotiations. The U.S. response, however, remained ambiguous. President Donald Trump, who had previously called the idea of an extension "good," later signaled a willingness to let the pact lapse, telling The New York Times in January 2026, "If it expires, it expires. We'll do a better agreement."
The Trump administration emphasized that any future arms control framework must include China, whose rapidly modernizing though smaller nuclear arsenal has become a central concern for U.S. strategists. Beijing has consistently rejected this premise, stating its forces are not comparable and that the primary responsibility for new talks lies with Washington and Moscow. With no formal agreement reached by the February 5 deadline, the Russian Foreign Ministry declared the parties were "no longer bound by any obligations," formally closing the book on the treaty.
The expiration of New START represents the culmination of a decades-long arc in nuclear arms control, which began with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1969. For national security conservatives, the event underscores long-held principles about the prerequisites for effective arms agreements. The conservative critique has historically emphasized that treaties must be:
From this viewpoint, New START's verification breakdown rendered it ineffective, while its failure to address newer Russian systems or China's buildup limited its strategic value. The call for a "better agreement" reflects a longstanding belief that the U.S. must negotiate from a position of strength and modernize its nuclear triad to ensure any future pact truly enhances American security.
The immediate future is one of heightened uncertainty. Both nations possess over 5,000 nuclear warheads each, comprising roughly 86% of the global stockpile. Without treaty-mandated transparency, understanding each other's force posture and intentions will become more difficult, increasing the risk of misinterpretation during a crisis. Analysts warn this could accelerate a qualitative arms race, with both sides pursuing new delivery systems, hypersonic weapons and other advanced technologies outside any regulatory framework.
In the short term, risk-reduction measures may offer the most feasible path to preventing conflict. These could include modernizing and securing direct communication links, expanding notifications of missile launches and major military exercises, and developing new protocols to avoid accidental escalation. Such measures, which can often be negotiated even in periods of political hostility, were successfully employed during the tense Cold War era of the early 1980s.
The post-New START era presents a profound challenge to global stability. The expiration of the treaty is not merely a diplomatic footnote but a strategic watershed, removing the last agreed-upon rules for managing the planet's most destructive forces. While the pursuit of a new, more comprehensive arms control framework that addresses modern threats remains a stated goal, the immediate priority for national security advocates is ensuring that American deterrence remains unquestionably credible and resilient. In a world where binding limits have vanished, the calculus of nuclear strategy returns to a stark first principle: stability must now be underwritten by strength, vigilance and a clear-eyed recognition of the dangers inherent in a renewed, unconstrained competition.
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